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An Introduction to Conventionalism 
An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning. By Steven J. Burton.* 
Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 1985. Pp. xviii, 241. $9.95. 
DENNIS M. PATTERSON** 
If for no other reason than the demands that the undertaking 
places on one's powers of clarity, brevity, and succinct statement, the 
writing of an introductory textbook on legal reasoning is a project that 
most would come to with some reservation, if not trepidation. An­
other, no less formidable problem, is to write a book that will' accom­
plish the tasks just mentioned without compromising broader interest 
in the text on the part of those using it as a pedagogical tool. 
Steven Burton has written a book that succeeds admirably at 
meeting the difficulties posed by an introductory text. I From a peda­
gogical perspective, the book thoroughly and analytically surveys the 
principal forms of legal reasoning (analogy and deduction) in the con­
text of what Burton describes as "the problem of importance."2 Turn­
ing from pedagogy to theory, the unique feature of the book is the 
presentation of a theory of interpretation in law that Burton identifies 
as "conventionalist."3 It is Burton's advancement of a theory of inter­
• Professor of Law, University of Iowa, College of Law. 
•• Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College, School of Law. 
B.A., 1976; M.A., 1978; J.D., 1980; Ph.D., 1980, State University of New York at Buffalo. 
1. These difficulties can, indeed, be burdensome. See Morawetz, Addressing Sacred 
Texts: On Jurisprudence by Soper and Lyons (Book Review), 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 489, 499 
(1985) (reviewing D. LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAw (l984) ("Lyons' abbreviated 
accounts of the ideas of others are often more misleading than the demands of compression 
would require."». 
2. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
3. Burton refers to his theory in several places as "conventionalist." A representa­
tive example is as follows: "The approach in this book emphasizes the judge's responsibil­
ity to the legal community'S conventions of language, argument, and judgment, which seek 
to work out the implications of order and justice in cases." S. BURTON, AN INTRODUC­
TION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 142 n.20 (l985). For an extended discussion of the 
philosophical sources for Burton's view of conventionalism, see infra note 36. 
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pretation, coupled with an exegesis of the basics of legal method, that 
mark this book as a unique contribution to jurisprudential literature. 
This review essay concentrates on two of the book's key, interre­
lated themes: methods of legal reasoning and legal interpretation . 
. The former topic is a necessary prelude to the latter, because while 
Burton sees the traditional forms of legal reasoning as important, in 
his view a full account of reason in law must contain a theory of how 
judges decide novel issues against the background of conventional 
legal practices. This is the theory of interpretation. The book is di­
vided into three sections, with the latter two containing the theory of 
interpretation that builds upon the description of traditional forms of 
legal reasoning found in the first part of the book. Taken together, 
they constitute a vigorous introduction to some of the most pressing 
issues in contemporary jurisprudence. 
I. THE ELEMENTS OF LAW AND LEGAL ARGUMENT 
In Part I of An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning, Burton 
describes legal reasoning as "an intellectual process"4 in which legal 
problems are addressed and solved, principally by the use of two forms 
of reasoning: analogy and deduction. As he emphasizes, before the 
forms of legal argument can be considered, more basic considerations 
need to be addressed. That is, before one can focus on the for~s of 
legal reasoning, one must first identify the material that is constitutive 
of legal reasoning itself. 
It is to state a truism to say that cases are the "stuff" of legal 
argument. But what is a case? How does one identify it, and what is 
its relation to legal argument? Burton suggests that a case is best re­
garded as a short story, having as it does a beginning, a middle, and an 
end. 5 The first phase of the story usually begins in the form of a dis­
pute between two or more persons or as a dispute between a citizen 
and an authority. The move to the middle phase occurs when one of 
the parties files a lawsuit against the other, and ends when the case is 
decided by a trial court in favor of one of the parties. As it happens, 
the story may not end there, for one of the parties, dissatisfied with the 
trial court's decision, may appeal the case to a higher court. When the 
case is finally decided, it is usually said that it establishes a rule or is an 
instance or application of a rule. 
A rule, which is "an abstract or general statement of what the law 
4. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 9. 
5. Id. at 11. 
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permits or requires of classes of persons in classes of circumstances,"6 
is by its nature quite general in scope.7 In other words, a rule ranges 
across a variety of circumstances and may encompass a wide range of 
cases. Each judicial decision presents an occasion for deciding 
whether the case before the court falls within the purview of a legal 
rule articulated in a previous decision. It is in answering this central 
question,8 that the forms of legal reasoning are employed. 
A. Analogical Reasoning 
Reasoning by analogy is a form of reasoning that is not peculiar 
to legal argument. 9 When, in everyday life, any two circumstances are 
compared with one another, the motivation for the comparison is to 
demonstrate that some material element lO in the one is or is not pres­
ent in the other: there is a difference between the two that makes a 
difference, and it is that difference that is articulated as a reason for 
disparity in treatment. The same is true in legal argument. When a 
new case is similar factually to one or more decided cases, that similar­
ity in fact figures as a reason in an argument for similarity in legal 
disposition. I I 
Burton demonstrates the analogical development of common law 
rules by employing an example taken from Lon Fuller. 12 In Case 1, 
Abbott steals a horse from Costello and sells it to Holliday, who buys 
it without notice of the theft. When Costello sues Holliday for its re­
6. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 13. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-50 
(1961); see also W. TWINING AND D. MIERS, How TO Do THINGS WITH RULES 48-72 
(1976). 
7. This generality, however, is no guarantee of equality, nor is equality necessarily 
associated with generality. See Raz, The Rule ofLaw and Its Virtue, in LIBERTY AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 9 (R. Cunningham ed. 1979). 
8. Even sophisticated critics of liberal legalism see this as a central concern of any 
legalist jurisprudence. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 89 (1975) ("The main 
task of the theory of adjudication is to say when a decision can truly be said to stand 'under 
a rule,' if the rule we have in mind is the law of the state, applied by a judge. Only deci­
sions 'under a rule' are consistent with freedom; others constitute arbitrary exercises of 
judicial power. "). 
9. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 666-67 
(P. Nidditch ed. 1975) ("Reasoning from Analogy leads us often into the discovery of 
Truths, and useful Productions, which would otherwise lie concealed."); N. WOLTER­
STORFF, WORKS AND WORLDS OF ART 58-105 (1980) (analyzing the role of predicates in 
identifying works of art). See generally J.F. Ross, PORTRAYING ANALOGY (1981). 
10. Burton does not endorse a philosophical realist's ontology. On the matter of on­
tology, he is strictly anti-realist. For a recent attempt to develop an anti-realist semantics, 
see C. WRIGHT, REALISM, MEANING & TRUTH 241-363 (1987). 
11. See J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 203 (1979). 
12. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 32-35 (citing Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdju­
dication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 375-76 (1978». 
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turn, the court grants relief to Costello, citing the rule that a thief 
cannot create an ownership interest in his transferee where the thief 
did not have title to the transferred property. A variation on these 
facts is presented in Case 2, where Abbott "purchases" the horse from 
Costello with a forged check drawn on another's account. When Cos­
tello discovers the fraud, he sues for return of the horse and is awarded 
a judgment. Here, the applicable rule is different: one who acquires 
property by fraud cannot acquire an ownership interest in it. 
What happens when, in Case 3, Abbott obtains the horse with a 
forged check, but sells it to Holliday before Costello can replevy it 
from Abbott? May Costello get the horse back from Holliday, the 
innocent purchaser? If the court applies the rules from Cases 1 and 2, 
it seems that judgment must be entered for Costello. Because Cos­
tello's ownership interest never has been extinguished, the thief has no 
legal interest and, thus, cannot pass legal title to the property. But the 
court may, and perhaps should, take notice of the important fact that 
Holliday took no part in the fraud perpetrated upon Costello. The 
court could fashion a new rule such that an owner of property who 
loses possession of the property by another's wrongful act may recover 
possession only from the perpetrator or from a subsequent purchaser if 
the wrongful act was theft. As Burton argues, this new rule remains 
faithful to the holdings in Cases 1 and 2 and, in addition, takes ac­
count of the material difference in Case 3 that Holliday's possession of 
the horse was acquired rightfully.13 
B. Deductive Reasoning 
As with analogical reasoning, deductive (syllogistic) reasoning 
has its roots in everyday contexts. For example, in the board game 
Monopoly, there is a rule that a player passing "Go" receives $200.00 
unless that player is going to "Jail," in which case the player gets 
nothing. 14 Likewise, if a teacher has a rule that students achieving a 
score of 90 or above on an exam will receive a grade of "A," then 
Susan must be given an "A" when she scores 92 on the exam. IS 
The syllogistic form of reasoning is such that if the premises of 
the syllogism are true, it is logically necessary that the conclusion be 
true. Despite its apparent simplicity, the syllogism is subject to abuse. 
Consider the following: 
MAJOR PREMISE: A foot has 39 inches. 
13. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 38. 
14. Id. at 42. 
15. Id. 
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MINOR PREMISE: Susan has a foot. 
CONCLUSION: Susan has 39 inches. 16 
Although the form of the argument mimics perfectly the form of 
the syllogism, the conclusion is nonsensical. The conclusion is un­
sound because the meaning of foot is not consistent between the argu­
ment's major and minor premises. 17 A syllogism "is only as good as 
its premises and the relationship between them."18 Thus, in the deduc­
tive form of argument, "[t]he key problems are (1) adopting a correct 
major premise; (2) formulating a correct minor premise in the lan­
guage of the major premise; and (3) using the relationship of the prem­
ises to yield a sound conclusion."19 
As several recent authors on the subject of deductive reasoning in 
law have shown, it is the language of the minor premise that poses the 
most significant problems for the deductive form of argument.20 Bur­
ton addresses this problem in the context of the "merchant's excep­
tion" to the Statute of Frauds in Article Two of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 21 When Franny Farmer, a seller of peaches, de­
cided that the time for marketing her crop was drawing near, she con­
tacted a distributor, Morris Auster. After inspecting the crop, Auster 
agreed to buy Farmer's peaches for the price of $40.25 per box. They 
shook hands but did not reduce their agreement to writing.22 
Shortly after arriving at their agreement, a severe rain storm 
struck the jurisdiction and much of the area's peach crop was de­
stroyed. Auster, concerned about his contract with Farmer, sent her a 
letter confirming their agreement. Farmer did not reply to the letter 
and a month later sold her crop to another vendor for $60.75 per 
box.23 
Burton devotes a fair amount of space to the analysis of this hy­
pothetical, considering carefully the many arguments that each of the 
parties could bring to bear in support of his or her contention that 
16. Id. at 43. 
17. The fallacy is that of equivocation. See A. ARNAULD, THE ART OF THINKING 
51 (J. Dickoff & P. James trans. 1964) (1st ed. 1662) ("A word is equivocal when men have 
linked the same sound to different ideas."). 
18. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 43. 
19. [d. at 43-44. For a recent argument for the centrality of deductive reasoning in 
law, see N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 19-72 (1978). 
20. See Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward An Ade­
quate Theory, 57 V. COLO. L. REV. 45 (1985); Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 151 (I 981). 
21. V.CC § 2-201(2) (1978). 
22. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 45. 
23. /d. 
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there was or was not an enforceable contract between them. The focus 
of the analysis is on the question of whether Farmer can be considered 
a merchant within the meaning of Section 2-104(3) of the U.C.c. 
Although deductive reasoning will not answer this question, an answer 
to it is of paramount importance to any syllogism in which the mean­
ing of the term "merchant" is to playa role. The judgment of a court 
as to the meaning of "merchant," in this context, is what Burton refers 
to as an instance of the "the problem of importance."24 In short! the 
decision whether or not to denominate Farmer as a "merchant," is one 
that is required "in order to decide which facts [about Farmer's activi­
ties vis-a-vis Section 2-104(3)] are reasons that justify placing a prob­
lem case in a class of cases designated by a legal rule. "25 
The merchant's exception to Article Two's Statute of Frauds is 
particularly helpful in making the point that the most powerful theo­
ries of legal interpretation are purposive;26 that is, they place at the 
24. Burton defines the problem of importance generally as "the problem of deciding 
which of the many facts in a case will or should lead a court to decide the case one way or 
the other because they count as reasons." Id. at 83. 
25. Id. at 53. 
26. Professor Tony Honore has recently put the matter this way: 
If the legal system is to be a continuing, problem-solving system, historical crite­
ria are not sufficient. For the rules to be interpreted have in that case to apply to 
situations not contemplated by their author or authors. But it is central to the 
process of legal interpretation that, though an inquiry into the author's meaning 
is often not sufficient, interpretation takes as its starting-point the words of non­
verbal practices to be interpreted. Its paradigm is the interpretation of a form of 
words or text: for example, the text of a statute, code, treaty, contract, will, regu­
lation, or some other document. This has two implications: first, that prima facie 
a legal text should be given the meaning, if any, intended by its author or the 
official body which adopted it; secondly, that nothing which the words could not 
mean counts as an interpretation of the text. Similarly, nothing inconsistent with 
a customary practice can count as an interpretation of that practice. 
These semantic constraints ensure that within certain limits officials and or­
dinary people can discover what laws prescribe, though sometimes only with diffi­
culty. In this way the semantic constraints further the ideology of law. But they 
leave a large area of choice. When norms set by society or individuals are incor­
porated in texts they become to some extent independent of the intentions of 
those who originally drafted or adopted them. To formulate a text is inescapably 
to run a risk about what it will be taken to mean; though lawyers try hard to 
reduce the extent of that risk. This fact leaves room, in the process of interpreta­
tion, for arguments which are not concerned with any possible meaning of the 
words used, let alone the one intended by its original author. For the choice 
between different meanings of, say, the term 'money' (cash, deposits, assets) can­
not be settled by recourse to anyone of those meanings. 
T. HONORt, MAKING LAW BIND 25-26 (1987) (footnote omitted). 
In the realm of literary theory, E.D. Hirsch remains the strongest voice for the 
supremacy of authorial intent in the interpretation of literary works. His thesis is set forth 
in E.D. HIRSCH, THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION (\976) and E.D. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN 
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center of any interpretive methodology the intended role or function of 
legal standards.27 History is a necessary element in any purposive the­
ory simply because it is in history that the purposes and aspirations for 
law are expressed.28 Resort must be made to those purposes and aspi­
rations before the meaning of a legal norm can, in any particular con­
text, be discerned. 29 
INTERPRETATION (1967). Recent developments of the theory by Hirsch include Hirsch, 
Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted, II CRITICAL INQUIRY 202 (1984); and Hirsch, 
Past Intentions and Present Meanings, 23 EsSAYS IN CRITICISM 79 (1983) .. 
For an impressive Wittgensteinian development of Hirsch's views, see C. ALTIERI, 
ACT & QUALITY 148-59 (1981) ("Meaning is determined as a set of words which make a 
semantically coherent statement which one can see in context as embodying or expressing a 
purpose. "). 
The role of intent in the interpretation of law is not an "all-or-nothing" affair. One 
sees this as soon as one recognizes that intention is not coextensive with meaning. See J.B. 
WHITE, HERACLES' Bow 101 (1985) ("The proper question is ... not 'what the writer 
intended,' as this question is usually meant-as if its answer were something other than an 
interpretation-but 'what this language by this speaker in this context means.' This is to 
some degree an objective and determinable question, for what the language means is the 
way it modifies our cultural situation."). See also J. HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIS­
COURSE OF MODERNITY 196 (F. Lawrence trans. 1987) ("It is one of the peculiarities of 
our language that we can separate utterances from their original contexts and transplant 
them into different ones ...."). 
A significant discussion of the intention-statement-audience approach to interpretation 
is found in C. CONDREN, THE STATUS AND ApPRAISAL OF CLASSIC TEXTS 286-93 (1985). 
27. An excellent example of such an approach, with specific application to the 
U.c.c., is McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some 
Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978). For a powerful presenta­
tion of the same approach in the context of moral discourse, see J. KOVESI, MORAL No­
TIONS (1967) (Moral notions do not evaluate the world of description but describe the 
world of evaluation.). 
28. Ronald Dworkin recognizes this in his analysis of practices, but fails to appreci­
ate fully its significance. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 46-53 (1986) (rules of 
courtesy). 
29. Hans-Georg Gadamer emphasizes this in his discussion of the importance of his­
tory as an element of "understanding" the law. He states: 
The jurist understands the meaning of the law from the present case and for the 
sake of this present case. As against this, the legal historian has no case from 
which to start, but he seeks to determine the meaning of the law by considering 
constructively the whole range of its application. It is only in all its applications 
that the law becomes concrete. Thus the legal historian cannot simply take the 
original application of the law as determining its original meaning. As an histo­
rian he will, rather, have to take account of the historical change that the law has 
undergone. He will have to understand the development from the original appli­
cation to the present application of the law. 
In my view it would not be enough to say that the task of the historian was 
simply to 'reconstruct the original meaning of the legal formula' and that of the 
jurist to 'harmonise that meaning with the present living actuality.' This kind of 
division would mean that the definition of the jurist is more comprehensive and 
includes the task of the legal historian. Someone who is seeking to understand the 
correct meaning of the law must first know the original one. Thus he must him­
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The importance of purpose for legal interpretation is well illus­
trated by Burton in his illumination of the connection between analogy 
and the deductive form of argument.30 Consider the following statute: 
It is unlawful for any person ... or corporation ... in any manner 
whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or 
encourage the importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any 
foreigner or foreigners, into the United States ... under contract ... 
to perform labor or services of any kind in the United States.3\. 
In 1887, the Church of the Holy Trinity, a New York corpora­
tion, contracted with an "alien," the English Reverend E. Walpole 
Warren, to serve as the church's rector and pastor. The church was 
prosecuted for violating the statute,32 with the lower court offering the. 
following deductive argument in support of its judgment: 
This suit is brought to recover the penalty of $1,000 imposed by the 
Act of Congress of February 26, 1885, upon every person or corpo­
ration offending against its provisions by knowingly encouraging 
the migration of any alien into the United States "to perform labor 
or service of any kind under contract" ... previously made with 
such alien. The defendant, a religious corporation, engaged one 
Warren, an alien residing in England, to come here to take charge 
of its church as pastor. 33 
In the course of vacating the lower court's ruling in favor of the 
government, Justice Brewer, writing for the United States Supreme 
Court,34 acknowledged the formal correctness of the lower court's 
logic. However, in reaching the conclusion that the scope of the stat­
ute did not include the activity at issue in the lawsuit, he looked to the 
evil that the statute was designed to prevent: the practice of disreputa­
ble capitalists of bringing large numbers of immigrant, uneducated la-
self think in terms of legal history-only that here historical understanding serves 
merely as a means to an end. On the other hand, it is not the historian's place to 
be dogmatic about the law. As an historian he moves toward historical objectiv­
ity in order to see its historical value, whereas the jurist, in addition, applies what 
has been learned in this way to the legal present. 
H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 290-91 (G. Barden & J. Cumming eds. 1975). An 
excellent, short summary of Gadamer's approach to interpretation is A. MEGILL, 
PROPHETS OF EXTREMITY: NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER, FOUCAULT, DERRIDA 20-25 (1985) 
(linking Gadamer's hermeneutics to the German Romantic historicist tradition and 
Heidegger's aesthetics). 
30. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 73-76, 79-80. 
31. 3 Stat. 332, ch. 164 (1885). 
32. United States v. Church of the Holy Trinity, 36 F. 303 (1888). 
33. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 73 (quoting Church a/the Holy Trinity, 36 F. at 303­
04). 
34. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
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borers to the United States to work for very low wages in offensive 
work environments. 35 
The case of cheap immigrant labor was, in Brewer's analysis, the 
"paradigm case" of the type of pernicious practice that Congress in­
tended to halt when it passed the statute. While Pastor Warren was 
undeniably an alien who had been brought to the United States to 
perform services for a domestic corporation, to punish that activity 
would not serve the purpose of the statute. Because the church's con­
duct was not of the sort that the statute was designed to prevent, the 
Court deemed it improper for the case to be brought within the stat­
ute's purview, notwithstanding the surface applicability of the act. 
Burton's purpose in discussing the Church of the Holy Trinity 
case is to demonstrate that deductive and analogical reasoning are 
each necessary. to an adequate account of legal reasoning and, more­
over, that neither can be used in any sort of mechanical way to solve 
legal problems. The case illustrates quite clearly that despite its pow­
erful role in legal method, even deductive reasoning can lead to unjust 
results, unless it is used in a careful and reflective manner. Having 
presented the basic elements of law and legal reasoning in Part I of 
Introduction, Burton then integrates those elements into a theory of 
legal interpretation. It is to that theory that we now turn. 
II. LEGAL METHOD AND THE INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITY 
The second and third parts of Introduction are the most ambi­
tious portions of Burton's book, and the ones that most directly will 
engage those with an interest in the role of interpretation in legal the­
ory. Here, Burton presents a theory of legal interpretation that is at 
the heart of his solution to the problem of importance.36 The theory 
35. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 74 (citing Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 
463 (quoting United States v. Craig, 28 F. 795, 798 (1886»). 
36. As noted above, Burton describes his theory of interpretation as "conventional­
ist." See supra note 3. Conventionalism has been the object of philosophical discussion 
since antiquity. Aristotle, for example, had this to say: 
Of political justice part is natural, part legal-natural, that which everywhere has 
the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that; legal, that 
which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent 
.... Now some think that all justice is of this sort, because that which is by 
nature is unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both here 
and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as just. This, how­
ever, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense; or rather, with the 
gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is something that is just even 
by nature, yet all of it is changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by 
nature. It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of being other­
wise, is by nature; and which is not but is legal and conventional, assuming that 
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both are equally changeable. And in all other things the same distinction will 
apply; by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should 
come to be ambidextrous. The things which are just by virtue of convention and 
expediency are like the measures; for wine and corn measures are not everywhere 
equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly, the things 
which are not just by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the 
same, since constitutions also are not the same, though there is but one which is 
everywhere by nature the best. 
Of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particulars; for 
the things that are done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal. 
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, *Book V, Ch. VII. 
In modern philosophy of science, conventionalism originates with the French mathe­
matician Henri Poincaire. See H. POINCAIRE, SCIENCE AND HYPOTHESIS (W. Greenstreet 
trans. 1905); Poincaire, On the Nature ofMathematical Reasoning, in P. BENACERRAF AND 
H. PUTNAM, PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS: SELECTED READINGS (1964). The most 
complete recent study of conventionalism in the philosophical literature is D. LEWIS, CON­
VENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969) (Regularity in behavior becomes a convention 
when it benefits the members of a group.). For an analysis of the historical role of conven­
tion in literary theory, see L. MANLEY, CONVENTION: 1500-1750 (1980). 
The linguistic conventionalism of the later Wittgenstein is a likely source of philosoph­
ical inspiration for Burton's position; however, intuition is of central importance in Bur­
ton's development of conventionalism. See, e.g., S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 132. 
Intuition is wholly inconsistent with Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical issues, par­
ticuIa:rly those in the philosophy of mathematics. See P. HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLU­
SION: THEMES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN 121 (rev. ed. 1986) 
("[Wittgenstein] viewed intuitionism as an aberration, a perversion in mathematics that 
stands in need of philosophical therapy, not as a source of inspiration in philosophy of 
mathematics, let alone as involving an insight that can be generalized to the whole domain 
of philosophical logic and philosophy of language."). See also G. HALLETT, A COMPAN­
ION TO WITTGENSTEIN'S "PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS" §§ 213-14, at 291-93 (1977); 
S. SHANKER, WITTGENSTEIN AND THE TURNING POINT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHE­
MATICS (1987). 
A strong philosophical source of inspiration for Burton is the work of the logician and 
linguistic philosopher, W.V.O. Quine. See W.V.O. QUINE & J. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF 
BELIEI' (1970). See also W.V.O. QUINE, WORD & OBJECT (1960); Quine, Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism, in W.V.O. QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20-46 (2d ed. 1961). 
Clearly, the metaphor of "web of beliefs" is crucial to Burton's development of the notion 
of an "interpretive community." S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 132-36. However, there are 
at least two reasons why Quine is not a good source for philosophical conventionalism. 
First, the metaphor of "web of beliefs" is a psychological description of how we think. 
It says nothing about the epistemology of justification. See L. BONJOUR, THE STRUCTURE 
OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 195 (1985) ("Quine's main view seems to be that the web 
picture simply describes our psychology, how we behave,.and think."). See also R.RoRTY, 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 221-43 (1979). "[Quine's] genial 'Don't let's 
throw out epistemology-let's let it be psychology' line is entirely reasonable if our aim is 
to show what in empiricism can be saved once we throw out the dogmas. But if we want to 
know why anybody thought it worthwhile, much less exciting or morally obligatory, to be 
an empiricist, we have to step back from the whole subject and press questions which Quine 
can safely neglect." !d. at 223. 
A second, and more compelling reason for avoiding Quinean notions is Quine's ex­
treme skepticism concerning translation. In Quine's view, no interpretation-even of the 
simplest of activities-can ever be preferred demonstrably over another. See R. TRIGG, 
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL SCIENCE 10 (1985) ("Quine insists that there will always be a 
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relies heavily on the notion of an "interpretive community"37 which, 
as is well known, is an idea that figures mightily in Owen Fiss' recent 
arguments against the rising tide of nihilism from within the legal 
certain indeterminacy of translation, even given the same sensory input. Interpretations of 
the most basic experience may differ, and indeed the very notion of a basic experience is 
exposed to an empiricist prejudice."). See generally G. ROMANOS, QUINE AND ANALYTIC 
PHILOSOPHY (1983). 
This leaves as Burton's last philosophical source for his view of conventionalism, the 
pragmatism of William James. See W. JAMES, PRAGMATISM (Perry ed. 1955). But James' 
empiricist conception of truth is incompatible with Burton's claim for the role of intuition 
in adjudication. See J. SMITH, PURPOSE AND THOUGHT: THE MEANING OF PRAGMATISM 
62 (1978) ("It has frequently been pointed out that James was unique among the 
pragmatists in assigning to the sensible element in knowledge a cognitive force of its own. 
This is true and it constitutes his point of closest contact with classical empiricism and its 
reliance on sense as an ultimate criterion."). See also C. MORRIS, THE PRAGMATIC MOVE­
MENT IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY (1970). An interesting comparison of the pragmatic 
perspectives of James and Quine is found in R. NEWELL, OBJECTIVITY, EMPIRICISM, AND 
TRUTH 39-61 (1986). 
As he unpacks it, Burton's theory is closest philosophically to the "later" writings of 
Wittgenstein, for the conventionalism of which Burton speaks are the "activities" of law­
yers (e.g., disputation, dialogue, justification, etc.). These activities comprise the "practice" 
of law. Claims of justification are advanced within a framework of pre-existing forms of 
rationality (this is where Burton sees intuition at work). 
As stated above, this perspective (absent the claims for intuition) is completely consis­
tent with Wittgenstein's general approach to language. See generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (E. Anscombe trans. 3d ed. 1953); L. WITTGENSTEIN, 
PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR ~ 55, at 97 (A. Kenny trans., R. Rhees ed. 1974) ("A reason 
can only be given within a game."); L. WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY ~ 82, at 12e (D. 
Paul & E. Anscombe trans., E. Anscombe & G. von Wright eds. 1969) ("What counts as an 
adequate test of a statement belongs to logic. It belongs to the description of the language­
game."). For an excellent assessment of Wittgenstein's views on the relationship between 
grammar, necessity, and justification, see J. RICHARDSON, THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTIFICA­
TION: AN INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1976). 
For a more recent discussion of conventionalism by Burton, see Burton, Reaffirming 
Legal Reasoning: The Challenge from the Left, 36 J. LEGAL EDUe. 358, 363-69 (1986). 
See also Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985). Dworkin takes up the topic 
of conventionalism in R. DWORKIN, supra note 28. His analysis of the shortcomings of the 
theory is wide-ranging, but his characterization of the theory does not accord closely with 
any of the descriptions of it given here. Of particular interest in the present context is his 
discussion of a conventionalist approach to Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 
(1889). I discuss Burton's analysis of Riggs from Burton's conventionalist perspective infra 
at notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
37. The notion of an "interpretive community" was first introduced by David Bleich. 
See D. BLEICH, SUBJECTIVE CRITICISM (1978). See also S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN 
THIS CLASS? 355 (1980) ("[I]nterpretation is the only game in town."). See generally E. 
SCHAUBER & E. SPOLSKY, THE BOUNDS OF INTERPRETATION: LINGUISTIC THEORY AND 
LITERARY TEXT 145 (1986). For a recent effort to enhance the notion of interpretive com­
munity with an "institutional" approach to legal discourse, see Joseph & Walker, A Theory 
of Constitutional Change, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155, 172-81 (1987) ("[T]he herme­
neutics of constitutional change must comprehend a notion of 'institution;' lacking in legal 
positivism . . . . This institutional framework is integral to our notion of interpretive 
community."). 
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academy.38 Other concepts that figure prominently in Burton's theory 
are W.V.O. Quine's metaphor of "web of beliefs,"39 intuition,40 and 
convention. 
Any theory of interpretation must, Burton argues, begin with 
some notion of how it is that two or more cases can be said to be 
"alike," and therefore, "members of the same legal c1ass."41 Borrow­
ing from Wittgenstein, Burton urges his reader to think of similarities 
among cases as akin to the likenesses between members of a family.42 
As with family members, no two cases will share all features in com­
mon, and yet, each is said to be "alike" in some important way. How 
is it that this "likeness" is perceived and articulated? 
The ability of lawyers to recognize the importance of empirical 
similarities among cases is largely a matter of "intuition," which Bur­
ton explains thus: 
[T]he fact of widespread agreement among members of the legal 
community on what the law permits or requires in a wide range of 
cases ... reflects professional intuitions that are developed by legal 
training and experience and influenced in each case by the conven­
tions of the profession. . .. Conventional practices and dispositions 
characterize the legal community adequately to treat it as an inter­
pretive community, which in significant respects is different from 
the people at large or other professional communities. The legal 
community in relation to a legal system is an interpretive commu­
nity whose job is to interpret the law, in addition to other 
functions. 43 
38. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982). A repre­
sentative example of the nihilism described by Fiss is Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. 
L. REV. 373 (1982). For criticism of the philosophical assumptions inherent in Levinson's 
position, see Patterson, Interpretation in Law-Toward a Reconstruction o/the Current De­
bate, 29 VILL. L. REV. 671 (1984). 
39. W.V.O. QUINE & J. ULLlAN, supra note 36. 
40. It is indeed quite possible that there is much less to be made of intuition in Bur­
ton's theory than I suggest (see the discussion of Burton's conception of conventionalism, 
supra note 36). Perhaps Burton means nothing more by intuition than what, in a different 
way, used to be referred to as "judicial hunch." An approach to intuition along this line is 
articulated in Bell, The Acceptability 0/ Legal Arguments, in THE LEGAL MIND: ESSAYS 
FOR TONY HONORE 45 (N. MacCormick & P. Birks eds. 1986) (legal reasoning takes place 
within a framework of. accepted canons of legal argument). See also G~ POSTEMA, BEN­
THAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 79 (1986) ("Argument from analogy to famil­
iar past cases or incidents or general features of shared social life is more likely to succeed 
... than creating a new rule which itself needs interpretation, before it can efficiently guide 
action. "). 
41. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 85. 
42. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (E. Anscombe trans. 3d 
ed. 1953) (the notion of "family resemblance"). 
43. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 95-96 (footnotes omitted). The appeal of the argu­
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The skeptical reader will no doubt question the empirical accu­
racy of Burton's claim that there exists widespread agreement among 
the legal community about what the law does and does not require. In 
fact, it is the very fact of widespread disagreement that fuels the fires of 
relativist rhetoric.44 While Burton acknowledges this group of detrac­
tors, his argument, which is more sophisticated than this brief review 
can convey, will no doubt fall short of the demands of those who reject 
any theory of interpretation that fails to generate a completely deter­
minate account of legal reasoning. Joseph Singer has recently put the 
challenge thus: 
A legal theory or a legal rule is determinate if it tells us what to do. 
A completely determinate theory or rule will leave us no choice; a 
relatively determinate theory or rule will constrain our choices, 
ment is, at bottom, to tradition and practice as normative constituents of the practice of 
interpretation. As one critic of the post-modernist movement in art has remarked in a 
similar vein: 
For a tradition to be in place, there have to be some shared standards of excel­
lence, some rules that are already established. These standards and rules cannot 
be determined by the individual-their authority derives from the fact of being 
socially determined by the practice. Only then can we criticize and try to change 
them. The central attitude of pluralism-that art is various, that whatever artists 
define as art is acceptable as an 'end' to be pursued-breaks down the unity of a 
narrative history that until now has made art intelligible and sustained its prac­
tice. Once there is no longer any ultimate agreement as to the rules which consti­
tute and sustain a practice--once there is no longer anything to impose 
constraints-all that pluralism can do is obscure the depths of our conflicts. 
S. GABLIK, HAS MODERNISM FAILED? 76 (1984). 
44. The usual reference is, of course, to Critical Legal Studies. But no general refer­
ence is appropriate, for there are certainly divisions of opinion within the Conference on the 
degree to which law can truly be said to be "indeterminate" and legal reasoning nonautono­
mous. Representative examples of each can be found in Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 
36 STAN. L. REV. I (1984) and in the essays collected in THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys 
ed. 1982). 
Roberto Unger, the Doyen of CLS, is himself not above criticizing the more extreme 
elements in "radical" legal thought. He writes: 
[T]he history of modem legal thought can be written in large part as the history 
of the discovery of the legal indeterminacy of such vague institutional projects as 
a market order or a representative democracy. The result is to leave rationalizing 
legal analysis without a ready-made foundation. Confronted with the ideas of the 
rationalizing legal analyst, the radical critic says once again: It's all politics .... 
. . . The claim of those who say that it's all politics is easy to misunderstand. 
It can be heard as merely the expression of a skepticism that has gone beyond 
modest eclectic response, evincing a more radical disbelief in the prospects for any 
style of social and historical explanation .... 
Those who take the all-is-politics side in this dispute have often given cause 
for this reading of their words. They have almost always failed to grasp the conse­
quences of their own position or to identify with clarity different ways to develop 
and support it. 
R. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 148-49 (1987). 
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. more or less narrowly, within boundaries. The claim that a legal 
doctrine is indeterminate means that the doctrine allows choice 
rather than constraining or compelling it.4s 
In presenting his theory of interpretation, Burton plays down the 
idea of constraint, and thus defers addressing directly those who reject 
as incomplete or inadequate any theory of legal interpretation that 
does not end with claims of absolute completeness and logical inexora­
bility.46 As he sees it, legal argumentation is not a matter of construc­
tion of impeccable deductive syllogisms, but is more in the nature of 
an ongoing "conversation"47 about order and justice in light of "the 
conventions of the legal community, as indicated by the legal experi­
ence and the totality of our theories about law."48 
But what is the "cash value" of these metaphors and generalities? 
We can see this most directly in the situation where a decision in a 
case can come out either way, depending upon the construction of an 
appropriate legal standard. In short, where two interpretive ap­
proaches are each embedded in existing legal conventions and are, 
seemingly, equally applicable to a set of facts, how is it that the choice 
of one over the other can be defended solely by reference to internal, 
legalistic criteria? 
The nineteenth century New York case of Riggs v. Palmer,49 first 
used by Ronald Dworkinso to demonstrate the importance of princi­
ples in legal reasoning, is pressed into service by Burton to illustrate 
the explanatory power of the metaphor of law as a "web of beliefs."sl 
In Riggs, the defendant Elmer Palmer killed his grandfather to accel­
erate his inheritance under the grandfather's will, and the question 
posed by the case was whether the murderer should take under the 
will or be denied his inheritance. Unreflective application of the New 
York wills statute mandated judgment in favor of Elmer. Thus, the 
issue considered by the New York Court of Appeals was whether to 
apply the statute "strictly" or, on some other basis, to deny Elmer his 
inheritance. 
45. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 11 
(1984). 
46. Burton does, however, consider several forms of legal skepticism, including Legal 
Realism and Critical Legal Studies, in the course of a general discussion of formal legiti­
macy. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 187-215. 
47. Id. at 204-05 (citing R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 
377-78, 389-94 (1980». 
48. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 204. 
49. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889). 
50. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 23-45 (1977). 
51. S. BURTON, supra note 3, at 138-43. 
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Burton points out that the majority opinion written by Judge Earl 
acknowledged the principle of legislative supremacy, but at the same 
time argued persuasively for the denial of Elmer's claim to his inheri­
tance. What was at stake in Riggs was the proper construction of the 
principle of legislative supremacy. To take a "strict constructionist" 
view of legislative authority would, Judge Earl reasoned, exact too 
high a cost to existing legal conventions. By drawing upon a multi­
tude of instances where strict application of statutes had been disfa­
vored, Judge Earl was able to convince his colleagues, and the legal 
community generally, that a judgment for Elmer would have been in­
consistent with "the collective experience of the legal community."52 
It was against this collective experience, or "web of beliefs," that an 
approach to statutory interpretation had to be developed. The only 
acceptable decision that could have been rendered was one that sought 
to "maintain as well as possible the coherence and pragmatic value of 
the law in its entirety, given the centrality of order and justice."53 
III. CONCLUSION 
The merit of Burton's description of a judge's work in terms of 
legal conventions forming a "web of beliefs" is in his demonstration of 
the inner rationality of the legal process. 54 The analysis is sophisti­
cated in that it employs provocative and perspicuous metaphors that 
effectively demonstrate the reflective character of legal judgment. 
What Burton appreciates and articulates so well is that judgment in 
law is not a determinate (in Kant's sense)55 faculty. Rather, judgment 
in law "is ... irreducible to algorithm, in the sense of formulation of 
fully explicit criteria of judgment. What is required is not a 'decision 
procedure,' but an education III . ,insight, taste, and 
understanding."56 
Beyond the contribution that this book makes to the literature of 
jurisprudence, is its value as a statement of what legal theory in Amer­
ican law schools can become. At the present moment, three "move­
52. Id. at 141. 
53. Id. at 142. 
54. For an "insider's" account of appellate judging, see F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A 
JUDGE (1980). 
55. I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 18 (W. Pluhar trans. 1987). Compare P. 
GUYER, KANT AND THE CLAIMS OF TASTE 39-40 (1979) (assessing Kant's analysis of the 
role of judgment in aesthetics) with S. WEBER, INSTITUTION AND INTERPRETATION 138­
44 (1987) (applying Kant's analysis of the role of judgment in aesthetics to literature). 
56. R. BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 163 (1983). See also M. NUSSBAUM, THE 
FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS 301 (1986) (For Aristotle, "[g]ood judgment, once again, sup­
plies both a superior concreteness and a superior responsiveness or flexibility."). 
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ments" dominate the jurisprudential landscape in American law 
schools. Two of these, Law and Economics, and Critical Legal Stud­
ies, represent attempts to politicize the legal process through the pres­
entation of arguments for the primacy of political vision over doctrine. 
The third "movement" is not really a movement at all, benefitting as it 
does from the fact that the orientation of those within it is descriptive 
rather than prescriptive. As Burton describes it, it is centrist, with the 
crucial claim being "that a conception of legal reasoning remains intel­
ligible and defensible."57 
This brings us to the principal merit of Burton's book. In clear 
prose, Burton offers to the uninitiated reader a sophisticated presenta­
tion of the essential claims of traditional legalism. 58 This is no easy 
task, and Burton has carried it off in exemplary fashion. It is clear 
that this book is but the first installment in what will become a sus­
tained and ever-enlarged development of an alternative vision of the 
legal process. Whatever the results of those efforts might be, Burton 
has demonstrated that philosophical appraisals of traditional elements 
of law and legal reasoning can indeed be viable, if not compelling. 
57. Burton, Reaffirming Legal Reasoning: The Challenge from the Left, 36 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 358,358 (1986). One important group oflegal theoreticians working in the natural 
law tradition are the Kantians. An impressive collection of essays reflecting their ap­
proaches is found in Symposium on Kantian Legal Theory, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 421 (1987). 
58. See J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 271 (1980) (A legal sys­
tem exemplifies the rule of law to the extent, among other things, that the making of judi­
cial decisions is guided by rules that are promulgated, clear, stable, and relatively general.). 
See also J. LUCAS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS 116-17 (1985) (describing the virtues of 
the rule of law). 
